THEY COULD STILL NUKE YOU

If we remember the post WW2 era 1945-1965, the American population of the time was painfully aware of the dangers of nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare. People in Europe were so discouraged and so conscious that we could bring about the end of the world, that they based a whole philosophical movement on this: Existentialism, questioning the very purpose of life and what its point was in view of the constant threat of a nuclear holocaust. But today we seem to have forgotten that those weapons still exist and that the other side has them. We live our lives carelessly, worrying only about how we could make more money to buy more things. There is a reason for that. The US and Europe have made so much progress on the field of tactical aviation, GPS and computer science in recent years, that we feel secure and have completely forgotten that those old weapons still exist and can kill.
 

The main problem with the Chinese nuclear arsenal is that not much is known about it. Let's take reliable sources for instance: The Jane's Weapons almanac. This publication is considered to be an authority on weapons and tactics worldwide, but its reputation may be largely exaggerated. Since 1983, it gives year after year the same numbers for China: total number of nuclear weapons 400. Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 250, non-strategic: 120. Only 20 ICBMs are supposed to be on hair-trigger alert and may be pointed at America.

Now, why should we question the reliability of Janes? Only one example should be enough. We find in the Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Ed. Duncan Lennox, Alexandria, Va., Jane's Information Group, 1997-2002 the following illuminating specifications for the Chinese gravity bomb:

Year Deployed: Unknown
Dimensions: Unknown
Weight: Unknown
Circular Error Probable: Unknown
Yield: strategic version approximately 3 megatons, tactical version 5-20 kilotons
Locations: Unknown
Number Deployed: Unknown
Primary Contractor: Unknown

Now that is precise! Probably no more needs to be said on Jane. As for other sources, there is naturally the Singapore essay of March 1996. A student from the National University of Singapore posted an essay on a web site claiming that China had more than 2,000 warheads. And the internal document of the Chinese Defense Ministry sent to the Hong Kong magazine The Trend (Dong Xiang) revealed that China had a total of 2,350 nuclear warheads. This number was about 8 times larger than the 300 generally cited in the Western media. Among the 2,350 warheads were about 550 tactical nukes and 1,800 strategic nukes. The document also reveals that the annual production of warheads was about 110-120 in the 1980's and about 140-150 at present.

The US Energy Department estimated the Chinese plutonium stockpile at 1.7-2.8 tons at the time, enough to deploy a nuclear force of only 400-900 weapons. Despite such obvious exaggeration, the Singapore essay is still taken seriously and frequently quoted to suggest that China might have substantially more nuclear warheads than widely believed. Various U.S. intelligence agencies even believed that, in the mid-1980's, China was producing at least 800 kilograms of U-235 and 400 kilograms of Pu-239 per year. So, the figures given in the Singapore essay might be accurate, but no-one knows for sure.

Another difficulty is the real size of these ICBMs and the yield of the warhead. Everyone has heard about the Dong Feng 5, DF4, DF31 even DF41, but what about the A as in DF5A, DF41A, DF31A? Everyone knows that a DF41 is smaller than a DF5, but when you add an A to it, it becomes much bigger, and three stage solid fuel at that. If in the original DF 41 you cannot even put a one megaton warhead and must be contented with a mere 500 kilotons, in the DF41A you have room enough to put a gigantic Satan SS18 20 megatons warhead. So the letter A brings some confusion here.

We could conclude this by quoting Jeffrey Lewis in the May/June 2005 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (vol. 61, no. 03, pp. 52-59): <<...it may come as a shock to learn that China's nuclear arsenal is about the same size it was a decade ago, ...the true size of the country's operationally deployed arsenal is probably about 80 nuclear weapons. ...The true scope of China's nuclear capabilities are hidden in plain sight...>>. He further argues that China's reluctance to provide numerical information about its nuclear forces is intended on letting ambiguity enhance their deterrent effect. Chinese force deployments suggest that Beijing's leadership believes that even a very small, unsophisticated force will deter nuclear attacks by larger, more sophisticated nuclear forces.

The Chinese leadership appears to have concluded that technical details such as the size, configuration, and readiness of nuclear forces are largely irrelevant. China's declaration that it would "not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances" reflects the idea that nuclear weapons are not much good, except to deter other nuclear weapons. In deciding what sort of nuclear arsenal to build, China settled on "the minimum means of reprisal." If this is true, China possesses in reality the smallest nuclear arsenal, smaller than the British who have fewer than 200 nuclear weapons.

Now it is very hard to know what to make of this, what to believe. If China has such a small stockpile, it means that it has been pulling America's leg for decades. If it has a much larger arsenal than expected, it has been pulling America's and every one else's leg too; but perhaps have we been selling them short all this time. Who knows?

The US intentions regarding further development of their nuclear arsenal are very clear since the advent of the Bush doctrine of preemption: construction of "mini-nukes", "bunker-busters" and neutron bombs designed to destroy chemical or biological agents. The administration is determined to overhaul its nuclear arsenal so that it could be used to strike the stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of rogue states.

There is definitely a US breakaway from global arms control treaties and the test ban treaty since the end of 2002. The new motto is New bombs and a new readiness to use them: low-yield weapons (tactical nukes), earth-penetrating weapons, enhanced radiation weapons, agent defeat weapons, which are all very tempting because they are more "usable".

Here is how Washington views other nuclear powers since 2002:

Russia: they are finished! They insist on enforcement of arms control treaties because they lack the means to maintain their stockpile ! They don't have the money for adequate maintenance of those old missiles and they even have difficulty to field the agreed 2000 ICBMs. They certainly don't have enough money to develop and field new weapons, so they are not credible and not a threat anymore!

China: they have less than 400 nuclear weapons.
Strategic Nuclear Weapons: 250
Non-strategic: 120
With so little, they are definitely not a threat!
And since they have only 20 ICBMs on hair-trigger alert and that those 20 are the only ones capable of reaching America, China can be discarded as insignificant.

France: they also have less than 400.
Definitely not enough to be a threat either! And although they are of better quality (guiding- and propulsion system, the warhead as a whole, etc.) and that they are the only regional power capable of having entirely replaced their arsenal by 2015, they also should be discarded as insignificant and hardly a threat!

Great-Britain: why should we worry? Their arsenal is under our control! Anyway, they got less than 200: a trifle!

Israel: granted, they got as much as 200! But what the heck, they are our ally! They wouldn't dare do anything embarrassing with it, or would they?

India and Pakistan: together they have less than 100. The worse that can happen is that they use them to annihilate each other. Hardly a concern, definitely not our business! This is just like the rest: insignificant!

North Korea, Syria, Iran and the rest: insignificant! They bark but don't bite! Nothing to worry about: WE REIGN SUPREME!

Does it not remind you of a pre-Pearl Harbor idiomatic expression of the English language called: TO SELL THEM SHORT? And when you do use it, doesn't it help the other side TAKE YOU FOR A RIDE? Underestimating the other side could prove a dangerous business. What is at stake here is not anymore the safety of the port facility of a naval base, but maybe the future of the planet. Let's ask a few questions.

1- The famous military yearbook Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems gives year after year the same figures for China's number of nuclear warheads since 1983, that is: approximately 400. Is this credible? Could it be that they have much more than that, but we don't know about it?

2- They can build hundreds of DF-3 and DF-5 for export but can field only 20 DF-5 for their air force! They have enough weapons-grade material to build thousands of nuclear warheads but choose to build only a few hundreds. The first Chinese Atomic Bomb detonated October 16, 1964, the first Chinese Hydrogen Bomb: June 17, 1967. It takes them only 32 months to get the H Bomb, the shortest elapsed time for any nuclear weapons state! France needed 8 years to reach the Hydrogen bomb, the US and Great-Britain 6 and 7 years. And now they pretend China is lagging behind in nuclear development! They can put several satellites on orbit at the same time for decades now, and we still ask ourselves if they really have achieved MIRV technology? Who is kidding who? Seems that they are pulling America's leg!

3- We know for sure that China does not put its ICBMs in silos, that its fleet of nuclear subs is smaller than France and that it has few bombers equipped with nuclear weapons on its airfields. Where do they put those extra ICBMs, if they exist ? In natural caves and underground tunnels ?

4- The project new Great Wall involving the digging of a maze of 2000 kilometres of tunnels under some mountain ranges (the Tai-Hai Mountain Range between Hebei and Shanxi provinces, the Tian Shan mountains and the Himalayas) is perhaps the answer: where they stockpile their ICBMs and even where they produce them?

5- Underground industrial plants and an underground nuclear stockpile make sense, since at least 20 entrances to possible underground tunnels have been spotted via satellite photos in the Tian Shan mountains. And we are not talking about the possible maze of tunnels under the Himalayas.

6- If the most part of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is deep under ground, a first strike against China is impossible! Its deterrents are safe and could be used in a second, third or fourth strike! China would then win a war against the Montana silos. It seems that the Chinese also have a manifest destiny; and is that not on the cards that both destinies should clash some day ?

7- But why underground tunnels and facilities? The answer is satellites. US military satellites can scan the whole planet earth and know about every new factory and industrial plant in every country, except if it is under ground (more than 70 meters underground to be precise). The missing Dong Feng 5 missiles could have been produced underground, either in natural caves or a man-made maze of tunnels. But why should we bother about DF-5? Just because they carry a 5 megatons' warhead each!

8- If they lay underground, could they be deployed fast enough to be a real threat? Yes if they are mounted on flatcars or trailers, ready to be carried outside and fired.

9- And officials of the People's Republic of China of course answer precise questions of the Press regarding their arsenal with a cryptic smile, a way of saying <<no confirm - no deny>>.

10- As for Russia, it is true that due to budget difficulties, they had a hard time trying to maintain their stockpile intact until 2002. But due to President Bush's new aggressive stance, the military budget has tripled since. There is enough money now not only to maintain the stockpile, but to expand it.

11- To circumvent the missile shield, everybody is re-MIRVing their warheads these days, they are using penetration aid (decoys), the French have worked on mathematical models allowing them to achieve real unpredictability for the trajectory of their missiles (the interceptor or kill vehicle will miss them because of these small evasion moves and slight changes of angle) and the stealth quality of low altitude. The Russians would saturate the system by the sheer number of missiles launched together, in a massive strike.

12- In spite of the extraordinary sophisticated observation- and detection means of the American military, and the gigantism of their famous Intelligence agencies, the US were unable to predict or foresee the first nuclear tests of both India and Pakistan, repeating thereby the famous failures of previous decades: when they were unable to foretell either the Russian- (Soviet) or the Chinese bombs. Further proof that technology does not replace human intelligence and is not a universal solution to modern problems, worldwide monitoring of telecommunications did not prevent the attack on September 11, 2001. If in crucial times, military intelligence couldn't see it coming for over 60 years, perhaps good old fashioned strategical- and political intelligence still remain quite useful.

13- As for the yield of nuclear warheads, there is a definite trend towards its reduction. In the last 30 years precision has increased so much, that it was not necessary anymore to carry huge warheads of several megatons. Circular Error Probable of American and Russian missiles previously estimated in kilometers, were later given in hundreds of meters, then tens of meter and now with GPS: a few meters or a few feet. Therefore, missile silos around the world are not safe anymore! The new motto became <<surgical precision>> and the yield of modern warheads ranges now in the tens- or hundreds of kilotons. The huge 20 megatons warhead of a Satan SS-18 belongs to another era.

The Chinese though have chosen to keep the good old fashioned big ones. DF-5 are equipped with a single 5 megatons warhead. The MIRVed version with six (6) one megaton warheads, a modified version of the DF-31 or of the DF-41 possibly with a single huge 20 megatons warhead like its Russian counterpart. Now that's power!

The philosophy behind lower yields is to believe that the explosions being smaller, the other side will not retaliate with heavier nuclear means. This belief is behind all research and development of tactical nukes. This assumption could be false though, even the one kiloton explosion of a suitcase bomb could lead to a nuclear retaliatory response and eventually to a full scale thermonuclear exchange. What is so hard to accept on the American side is to be considered EQUAL. MAD (mutual assured destruction) was intolerable because it meant that both sides were equally strong. Equality goes against every principles of a certain capitalist philosophy that dictates that the purpose of life is to become bigger, stronger, better than the other side. The aim is to beat them and to let them know that they are inferior and that we are the best: the biggest in the world.

So, it was necessary to find ways to go around MAD and these international nuclear treaties that were insufferable equalizers, and to reassert America's superiority. Therefore SDI, NMD, the missile shield, mastery of the GPS, etc...

14- `Star Wars' (the SDI) was a trick to break the economy of the Soviet Union, and it worked and brought about the fall of Communism worldwide in 1989. There was then a chance to establish world peace as Capitalism emerged the winner. But Mr. Bush and the Clinton administration blew it. George W. Bush has even restarted the nuclear arms race. He did so by abandoning the START II treaty, by withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and by expanding NATO to the borders of Russia. The new doctrine of
"preemptive wars" finishes any hope that the rest of the world might still have had. Not that communism will return, but everybody is searching for something else these days; then it has become quite clear that a certain brand of capitalism and democracy is definitely not the answer.

15- A sole victor emerged (capitalism, the US). The former enemies were not really defeated though, because the war was never fought. They simply decided not to be enemies anymore, in some cases they changed names (the Soviet Union became Russia), some countries were split, created, changed sides, changed allegiance. The irony though is that the victor does not feel more secure for it. It has few friends, few real allies and new enemies. Yesterday's enemies (in Eastern Europe mainly) have seen their economic situation improve slightly and are generally better off than in times of the Cold War. However, a word of caution to the new world leader should be that any great leader of a great nation has a tendency to create against himself a vast coalition of violent enemies through rash actions, daring, stubbornness and arrogance. The textbook example of this is Napoleon of course!
 

Given all that, one could ask more than ever: ARE WE SELLING THEM SHORT or ARE THEY TAKING US FOR A RIDE?

Note: As we mentioned that the French have worked for some time on the unpredictability of the trajectory of their missiles, we should have added that, as a rule of thumb, every significant discovery made by the French takes six months to reach Russia, one or to years to reach China and that the Americans and British hear about it 10 to 15 years later, and generally by accident! Why is that? Lack of communication, better liaisons with certain countries than with others, or more accurately: that the Anglo-saxon world does not take the French seriously? Sometimes, the consequences are quite severe: for instance the Exocet missile and the British Navy that loses two prestigious units to enemy fire during the Falklands war.

We've all heard reports stating that with the break up of the Soviet Union there are numerous warheads unaccounted for. Since the START II treaty is now over, and that both sides talk less often to each other and are not really disarming anymore, this does not help!

Either the Russians still have the unaccounted for weapons, or they don't have them, and terrorist organizations and rogue states have them.

But don't worry, they still talk to each other and they still have them. To believe that Al Qaeda has them is mere science-fiction. But if they still have them, why the mystery ?

Russian history shows that they believe in numbers; they must have twice as much, or even many times over the amount of weapons that the enemy has, just to feel secure. Is it an inferiority complex (not believing that their weapons are as good qualitywise as those of the enemy) ?

1- At the beginning of Hitler's invasion of Russia, there were only 3200 tanks available for all the Panzer divisions of the German army. They were facing an enormous Russian tank park of 24000 machines. And while these were outdated and obsolete models for the most part (T-28s, T-35s, old light tanks of the BT series) it took a lot of time, ammunition, and men, as well as wear and tear of the brand new German models to destroy these masses upon masses of old equipment. The German high-command was furious. While they were destroying the old equipment in the plains of Ukraine and elsewhere, it gave the Russians ample time to mass-produce the new T-34 and KV heavy tanks.

2- Once the Japanese navy under Togo had destroyed the Russian fleet at Port-Arthur in 1904, they had immediately to face another one sent from Europe. The Russians like to have two or three fleets of war vessels, like I said they believe in numbers.

3- In 1814-1815 they waited until the coalition forces outnumbered the French five to one before invading.

4- At the battle of Kursk, the Germans were so badly outnumbered and outgunned (1,300,000 men, 20000 guns, 3600 tanks and 2400 aircrafts) that the rest of the war 1944-45, the march on Berlin, could really be compared to a steamroller that crushes and flattens everything in its path.

5- At the end of the war and during the beginning of the cold war, the Russians had this capability (superiority in numbers) to bulldoze and overrun Europe and that was the very reason why NATO was established. Later, around 1980, the superiority in numbers still existed in favor of the Eastern nations of the Warsaw Pact. Those thousands upon ten thousands of Russian tanks and SS20 midrange nuclear missiles worried the West a lot, and induced the US to research and develop tactical nukes, a high-tech- and computerized tactical aviation and the GPS to counterbalance this inferiority in numbers.

That is the reason why some believe that they still have those old weapons, and it wouldn't be surprising if they still have and maintain old things like the SS20 that was supposed to have been taken out service in 1987. In fact, this inferiority complex we are talking about, could induce them to maintain and upgrade a lot of those old weapons secretly in remote facilities that we know nothing about. The real size of the Russian nuclear arsenal may be twice as big or even bigger than what the official figures suggest.

Fear and lack of self-confidence may be dangerous things when they apply to nations and political regimes.

By the way, are those old nukes still potent, in some cases even after 50 years ? Is for instance an old soviet missile, say built around 1960, still dangerous; could it still be fired and reach its target 8000 miles away even after having been left for a long time without proper maintenance ? Some say that the liquid fuel babies built at the time could still be dangerous, especially if they were properly kept in <<dry storage>> (this is also true for solid fuel engines). An old inertial (gyroscopic?) guiding system could still bring the warhead right on target even after a century.

1- 19 or 20 tests have been made so far over the years with a success rate of less than 40%, isn't it a bit risky to gamble the security of the continent, entrusting it to a system plagued with a 60% failure rate ?

2- Once a hostile launch has been detected via satellite and its trajectory is monitored by the array of radar stations on the ground, the means to stop it are decided by the strategic command centre in Cheyennes Mountains, Colorado. You have three or four minutes to react (depending on the propulsion of this ICBM: liquid or solid fuel). Subtract the time of detection and your super-computers have no more than 100 seconds (less than two minutes) to calculate its trajectory, send a high-powered laser beam or an ABM missile to destroy it. Isn't it a bit short ? 100 seconds, when you cut these thing so close, it could seem that MAD is still in force. Or is it ?

3- The shield or nuclear umbrella is made of radar-satellites, laser-satellites and short- and long range ABM missiles. It's job is to detect, intercept and destroy enemy missiles before final re-entry. Low-orbit satellites equipped with high-powered laser produce enough energy to destroy the missile proper (rocket, engine, combustion chamber, etc) in mid-flight, BUT NOT THE WARHEAD. Is there a problem ?

4- What happens to the warhead, once the body of the missile has been destroyed ?

5- The ABM missiles are deployed on board of AEGIS cruisers and all this is under control of super-computers. What happens in case of a general power failure ?

6- The operation concept seems a bit complicated. Surveillance satellites detect enemy rockets and the three steps defence begins immediately. First phase: lift off and gaining altitude. The targets are immediately destroyed by lasers. Second phase: they have reached cruise altitude and are attacked and destroyed by ABM during their ballistic flight, especially when they eject or let go of their lift-off engines. Third phase: all surviving missiles will be intercepted by Patriot antimissiles during their atmospheric re-entry. The short-range ABM Patriot missiles are then the last line of defence. They got a few seconds at the most to destroy the enemy in the final phase of its flight. Question: how many will survive the three phase defence plan and get through to their target nonetheless ?

7- To destroy a very fast moving missile at a great distance is in itself a technologic tour-de-force. It takes both great precision and an incredible energy. As for the precision, you must direct a laser beam on a fast moving object over thousands of kilometres in space. You have also to maintain the beam on the object for a sufficient lenght of time to destroy it. What happens in case of atmospheric turbulence or optical deformations ?

8- In reality nothing indicates that such a technology could be reliable enough to make an atomic umbrella work. In matters of defence, to survive, one has to make the difference between dreams and reality. It is better to have in your hands an old reliable rifle that shoots straight, rather than a flashy, sophisticated, goldplated, state-of-the-art weapon that jams all the time and is constantly in need of upgrade and repair. Reliability has no price !

9- Knowing its own vulnerability facing the weapons of the enemy makes you more careful and open to diplomacy, while when convinced of having the miracle weapon in your arsenal, you become arrogant and invite danger. The opposition will eventually find ways to go around your defenses and neutralize them.

10- If the idea of a full proof antimissile defence, although based on an unrealistic strategy, is still alive and discussed today, is it not because it is put forward by an armament industry permanently in search of important credit allocations ?

11- If most of the tests conducted for the acquisition of a reliable anti-missile umbrella concerned the interception of a single missile with all the radar-satellite-ABM network, and especially since more than 60% of these tests failed, should we not be concerned ? Since a first strike against America (with the notable exception of a single missile agression case by a rogue state of the third-world) would involve at least a few hundred warheads to up to a 2000 missiles as a first volley, in the worst case, would the shield be able to knock down a significant portion of them in the first phase, to allow long- and short range ABM to handle the rest ? And what happens when the MIRV missiles cannot be caught on time ? If 40% or more of the first volley reach their targets, it could prove fatal. Has this be taken into account by those advocating the anti-ballistic shield ?

12- Since it has been proven that the <<star wars>> or strategic defence initiative SDI of the Reagan era was a hype to break the Soviet economy, do you think the Russians would fall for it a second time ?

13- And what about the Bush doctrine of pre-emption and contemplating the theoretical possibility of a first strike, away from the <<no first use>> of the cold war. Are we ready for that ?

14- Since a first strike makes sense only if you can destroy ALL the enemy's deterrents in a single blow, could you risk it if you don't know exactly where ALL the enemy's long range nukes are? And what about China ? Since the famous military yearbook Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems gives year after year the same figures for China since 1983, that is: number of nuclear warheads: approximately 400, and since it gives the same figures for 2004, some doubts may emerge. We know for sure that China does not put its ICBMs in silos, that its fleet of nuclear subs is smaller than France and that it has few bombers equipped with nuclear weapons on its airfields. Where do they put those ICBMs ? In natural caves and underground tunnels ? The project new Great Wall involving the digging of a maze of 2000 kilometres of tunnels under some mountain ranges, is there where they stockpile their ICBMs ? And how can we be sure that they only have 400 nuclear weapons if the Jane's military almanac, for one, only prints the few pictures that the Chinese republic gives them ?

15- If the most part of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is deep under ground, a first strike against China is impossible ? Its deterrents are safe and could be used in a second, third or fourth strike ? China would then win a war against the Montana silos.

At any rate, the layman that tries to search Yahoo or Google to know the real size of the world's nuclear arsenal these days comes across many difficulties. First he gets buried in a mass of information that is not always relevant, often outdated, but worse contradictory. Even the most knowledgeable and renowned sources, the FAS, the EFNS or the Bulletin of Atomic scientists, will at some point admit that they are contradicting themselves and that they don't know.

Size of the Russian nuclear arsenal for the year 2000:   28240 warheads
Size of the Russian nuclear arsenal   as of may  2004:     7800 warheads

What happened in those four years, The Russians got rid of 20000 warheads just to please us ? Wow! The Bulletin stated: <<an estimated 18,000 of these are awaiting dismantlement or in reserve>>.

You will excuse the layman here if he asks just this one question: WHAT DOES HAPPEN when they decommission a nuclear warhead ??

a- they dismantle the warhead and bulldoze the body of the missile like the Iraqi did publicly at the beginning of 2003,

b- they remove the warheads and store them separately (keeping them so to say <<in components>>), the warheads are put in one place while the missiles proper and/or external casings are stocked in another,

c- they don't dismantle the missile they simply take it out of active status and store it in some remote hangar or military depot,

d- an international committee of observers (so-called inspectors) is watching the whole thing and advising the Russian representatives as for the best way of disposing of the nukes,

e- no verification whatsoever is ever made. The press and the international opinion simply take the word of the nuclear Power that says that it has dismantled such warheads at its face value,

f- none of the above

The figures for 2004 could be correct and no more than 7800 Russian warheads are currently deployed. But how many do they got in reserve ? Since the many protocols and treaties on nuclear disarmament that have been signed in the past have either been canceled or are now in difficulty (following the new post-911 aggressive US stance), a clear accounting of- and transparency about the real size of the world's nuclear arsenal is impossible. Add to this the fact that Washington declared in mid-August 2004 that they would allow no verifications on American soil and you have a clear picture that the world peace decade of 1990-2001 is definitely over.

The main threat to the emerging missile shield may not be at all a massive strike of hundreds of MIRVed ICBMs , but simply a few warheads that have not been launched via missiles but hurled into space by a giant railgun and re-entering for their final trajectory and aiming on target with the simple help of side- or auxiliary rockets.

There would be no detection of a launch by radar and no attack of the missile during the boostphase by satellite-based lasers, simply because there would be no launch, no boost-engines and no missile. This is not to say that there would be nothing on radar screen though. The echo or dot on the screen would be much smaller because the object is indeed much smaller (there is only the warhead), this would be a very low radar-signature thing and to the operator on duty it would look just like a UFO, then its velocity would be much greater than a normal missile.

You're imagining things! Railguns are science fiction! Not necessarily.
Some very serious research has been made at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and at the University of Texas' Centre for Electromechanics before 1990 and abandoned, because full scale guns that have been built and fired all suffer from extreme rail damage and needed to be serviced after every shot. Rail and insulator ablation issues still needed to be addressed before railguns could start to replace conventional weapons.

The Chinese were extremely interested in the possibility that giant railguns could theoretically deliver projectiles to space, put satellites into orbit and eventually send nuclear warheads right on target (with the help of re-entry rockets of course).

Operational railguns delivering hundreds of warheads would render the anti-missile shield of Mr.Bush just as useful as the Maginot line was in its days.

Remember old Cold War nuclear scenarios ?

What would happen in case of a US first strike ? Could it succeed ? What would be the strength of a Soviet Union's retaliatory response as a second strike (how many of its deterrents would survive the attack?)? How many deaths ? Assess the damage to the economic and industrial infrastructure of both countries; would it be the end of civilization as we know it ?

We remember those questions well, but have they really become irrelevant with the fall of the Soviet Union ? Could we still ask them ? Maybe. But not exactly the same questions as before, because the situation has changed.

Let's re-ask the first question ! What would happen in case of a US first strike ? The second question in that case is not anymore how strong a Russian second strike would be (like in the sixties) but how many countries would join in a second strike. Furthermore, the first question cannot anymore be asked in that manner: first strike against whom ? China, North Korea, Russia, Iran ?

And what would happen in case of a Russian or Chinese first strike ?

The situation has changed because there are more players (officially 9 instead of the previous 5) and there will be more soon. So, new questions arise that were never asked before. For instance:

What would happen in case of an Israeli first strike ? Who would respond, who has or will soon have the capability of a second nuclear strike against Israel ? Three countries: Iran, Pakistan and Syria. So, such an occurrence is highly improbable, ...for the time being!

But even old questions have different answers now. It has been assumed for a long time in certain circles that in nuclear war, as a rule of thumb, the aggressor or initiator of a first strike would have everybody against him ... and lose. The textbook example was that of Russia. If it initiated a first strike, America would strike back and so would Great Britain and France. China, it was assumed would remain neutral.

The end of the Cold war though, and especially the Bush doctrine of preemption have changed everything. Let's reconsider the case of a US first strike, say against North Korea this time. The situation is not clear anymore.

What would the following countries do in that case: Great Britain, France, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, Israel, Iran ? Would they stand by America, fight against it or remain neutral ? The case of France is interesting. During the Cold war, in case of a Russian aggression, it would have stand by America, there is no question about it. But now ? Depends. If we go to the extremes, in case of a successful US first strike against Russia or China, the answer could be appalling. Maybe the French would consider that America has turned rogue and would launch against it to finish it off. This was unthinkable ten years ago.

And what would the others do ? A little game to put this line of thought into practice would be to pick up a country in the list of ten (let's assume that North Korea has also the bomb) as the initiator of a first strike, pick up a second country as target and ask yourself what the others would do. Remain neutral, fight on your side or against you ? Do that for every single one on the list of nuclear powers. Be realistic about it though: a country possessing only midrange missiles could not attack another located on the other side of the planet. If you do this carefully, you could be surprised at the results, especially if in each case you ask yourself the big why.

You could come across results like this: India attacks Pakistan. Everybody remains neutral. Really ? Even Israel ? Why ? You'd be surprised. we don't suggest to turn this into a kind of RISK game, but if we consider that 45 to 50 countries have now the capability to build nuclear weapons and delivery systems in a few years' time, odd questions could soon be asked. Like: ''if they become a nuclear power what would they do, whom would they side with ?'' and these could apply to countries that never hoped to belong to the nuclear club until recently, for instance New Zealand or Japan.

For any student of strategy, the situation is extremely interesting (<<fascinating>> as Mr. Spock would put it in Star Trek), to the layman it is confusing, and to certain experts in the field it is alarming. Rightly so !

For more forbidden thoughts on the subject go to:
home.ca.iner.net/~giskhan

or to the politically not correct rogue strategy-site:
giskhan.tripod.com