Machiavelli

In his famous analytical work on power (the Prince), Nicholas Machiavelli gives the techniques and practical applications to gain and keep political control over people and nations. In this theorizing, it seems that he tries to find some kind of formula, a compendium of recipes to gain or maintain political and military power. He did so by comparing the deeds of local Italian princes of his time, taking examples from the Romans and carefully studying some aspects of the only attempt at world domination that he knew about (Alexander the Great). He didn't know or pretended not to know about Genghis Khan (Napoleon and Hitler would come much later), so the only attempt at world conquest that he could invoke in his writings was the Macedonian empire.

HEREDITARY MONARCHIES
It is easier to maintain an old hereditary monarchy in a country used to be ruled by a single royal family, than to try to keep in power a new one. Then it is quite enough to refrain from trespassing against old customs, respect local traditions and improvise for the rest. As prince, an average person with mediocre qualities can stay in power forever.

NEWLY ANNEXED TERRITORIES
It is difficult to keep a newly annexed dominion, because people easily change their masters in the hope of improving their living conditions. This hope makes them take up arms against their rulers, but they are soon disappointed when experience shows that they have changed for the worse. This is caused by the inevitable damages inflicted on the local population by the soldiers of the occupation army and by the harshness of the occupation itself.

The occupation creates enemies. It is therefore important not to provoke the population. Do not change old traditions. Change nothing in their laws and their taxes.

When a state acquires a territory with strange laws and customs and where a different language is spoken, there are great difficulties to overcome in order to keep it. The best way would be for the head-of-state to go and take up residence there. To inhabit the newly annexed territory would secure it in a unique way: being on site, disorders can be witnessed firsthand and remedied immediately, the land is not robbed and plundered by local administrators then the leader is there to watch them closely, and finally the new citizens can get justice that much faster by appealing directly to the head of the state in person.

The other way is to plant colonies on the new territory, to implant settlements on all strategic points. It is either necessary to do this or to maintain a large occupation force. These colonies will cost much less to implant and very little to maintain. The only ones that are hurt are those who will get their houses and their lands taken to give to the colonists. The dispossessed (expropriated) are too few to be much trouble. The majority of the population does not suffer as it would if an occupation army would remain. That way, it can be easily pacified, but will still fear the possibility of dispossession.

Furthermore, the one governing a newly annexed province must defend its weaker neighbours and try to weaken its stronger ones. He must take care that they would not be invaded by a foreign power as strong as himself. Such a power would be asked to intervene by malcontent citizens.

When a foreign power invades, the poor and less fortunate inhabitants become its supporters. They are motivated by envy, jealousy and hatred for the local elites. These elites become supporters too. The trick is not to give too much power to those elites and bring down the rest of the opposition.

One should never allow the creation or increase of disorders and public unrest in order to avoid war. Sometimes, war cannot be avoided. It can be differed only to the advantage of the other side.

Whoever helps- or allows another to become powerful is ruined himself. For that power is produced by him either through craft or force; and both of these are suspected by the one who has been raised to power.

WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS DID NOT REBEL AGAINST ALEXANDER'S SUCCESSORS AFTER HIS DEATH

Because it was centralized and unified. The king held the totality of power. The conquest of a centralized monarchy may be tougher, but it is much easier to keep afterwards because of the unified authority. All that is needed is to destroy or control the old ruling family.

On the contrary, a decentralized monarchy with numerous local leaders is easier to invade. With the help of malcontent local barons it is easy to enter it. It is much harder to keep it though, then the power is and has always been fragmented. This means numerous uprisings, a great number of barons and chieftains to appease and satisfy. Unification of authority may prove difficult (even impossible): those you have won over first could turn against you, and those who were hostile will stay that way.

THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES AND PROVINCES THAT, PREVIOUS TO BE OCCUPIED, LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS

There are three ways to hold cities and states accustomed to live at liberty under their own laws. The first is to despoil them, the second is for the Prince to go and live there in person, and the third is to allow them to live under their own laws. But in truth, there is no sure method to keep free-cities, save by despoiling them. Whoever becomes ruler of a free city and does not destroy it, will be destroyed by it. This because its population will always find a motive for rebellion in the name of liberty or of its ancient traditions. As long as its inhabitants stay grouped together, they won't forget the call of freedom. The only way would be to separate them, to disperse them by deportation.

Republics and free cities cannot forget or put aside the memory of their old freedom, so the surest way to keep them is either to lay waste to them or reside in them.

TERRITORIES NEWLY ACQUIRED BY FORCE OF ARMS OR ABILITY

Newly acquired territories are more or less easy to hold according to the greater or lesser ability of him who acquires them. The rise to power of a simple citizen presupposes either great ability or much luck. However those who owe less to good fortune will maintain themselves more easily.

Yet, it is necessary to wait for a favourable occasion. Without this opportunity, the excellent qualities of a man go to waste, and without these qualities the best occasion is still useless. The rise of an opportunity gives the great man his chance, and his great qualities allow him to benefit from it, along with his country.

He who reaches power by his personal ability, acquires his kingdom with difficulty but keep it very easily. The difficulties arising by the acquisition of the new dominion are due to the new rules and regulations that the prince has to introduce in order to establish his position firmly. Nothing is more difficult than to initiate a new order of things. Those who profit by the old order are against it, and those who would profit by the new are lukewarm and barely believe in it. It is therefore necessary that those reaching power can depend on their own strength and be able to use force if necessary to coerce the population to accept the new order of things, then only armed prophets have durably conquered hearts and minds. The character of people varies, their opinions are changing (it is easy to persuade them of one thing, but difficult to keep them in that persuasion); it is therefore necessary that, when people no longer believe, they can be made to believe by force.

Those who have reached the means to make the unbelievers believe by force may have had difficult beginnings and have overcome many obstacles with skill and perseverance, but when they gained the respect and veneration of the people and suppressed their rivals, they obtained the security of their power, the joy, happiness and honours.

NEW DOMINIONS ACQUIRED BY THE POWER OF OTHERS OR BY FORTUNE

Private citizens who rise to positions of power by mere chance have little trouble in rising but very much afterwards to maintain themselves. All their difficulties arise when they are established. They depend absolutely on the good will and fortune of the foreign power which has raised them. But luck and good will are fickle friends. These new princes are incapable to maintain their rank because they possess no forces friendly and faithful to them. Moreover, states quickly founded cannot have deep roots and wide ramifications inside the population. The first storm destroys them, unless the new prince takes immediate steps to maintain his sudden good fortune and lay afterwards those foundations which others made before becoming princes. He who does not lay his foundations may by great ability do so afterwards, although <<with great trouble to the architect and danger to the building>>.

It is therefore necessary that the new prince secures himself against his enemies, gains new friends, conquers by force or fraud, makes himself beloved and feared by the people, followed and reverenced by his soldiers, that he destroys those who may injure him, introduces innovations into old customs, be severe and kind, that he suppresses the old militia and creates a new one, and finally that he maintains the friendship of kings and princes in such a way that they are glad to benefit him and fear to injure him.

One should never allow someone that he has offended in the past or who could stand in fear of him to rise in the social scale and become powerful. If he could prevent it, he should, then old offenses are never forgotten and the wronged individual will always try to avenge himself out of hatred or jealousy.

OF THOSE WHO HAVE ATTAINED THE POSITION OF PRINCE BY VILLAINY

There are two ways to become head of state: by nefarious or villainous means (dictatorship) or through the favour and consent of one's fellow-citizens (democratic means). Quite often, a dictator having seized power through wickedness will maintain himself without much difficulty, especially if he is skillful. Cleverness consist here in exploiting well the cruelties that one has to commit. Well committed cruelties are those perpetrated once for the need of security, and which are not persisted in, but exchanged gradually for clemency measures useful to the citizens.

In seizing power, the conqueror must commit all the necessary cruelties at once (in one stroke), so as not to have to recur to them again. It is in not repeating them that the trust of the population may be won. Benefits though should be granted to the population only little by little, so that they may be better enjoyed.

OF THE CIVIC PRINCIPALITY

Let's consider now the case of those who take power by the favour of their fellow-citizens. They can succeed by the help of popular favour or by the favour of the aristocracy. The aristocracy wants to command and oppress the people, but the populace desires to avoid such an oppression. He who becomes prince with the help of the nobility will have greater difficulty in maintaining his power than he who is raised by the populace, because those nobles will think themselves his equals, while the populace very well knows that it is not the equal of its prince. It is then much easier to satisfy the mass of the people than to satisfy an already privileged elite.

It is easy to keep the friendship of the people, then it asks nothing else than not to be too much oppressed. This friendship is important to the prince who has no other recourse in case of adversity, when times become really difficult.

EVALUATE THE STRENGTH OF PRINCES AND STATES

A strong prince can maintain himself alone in case of need or adversity, he does not need the protection of others. He is capable of it through the abundance of his men, of his money and the strength of his army. The strong one will not be attacked very often, then others are reluctant to attack a prince with a territory and a town stoutly defended and who is not hated by his people. Therefore, a prince who possesses a fortified town and has not made himself hated by the people cannot be assaulted successfully.

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF MILITIA AND MERCENARY SOLDIERS

It is necessary for a prince to have strong foundations. The chief foundations of a state are good laws and good arms. The arms by which a prince defends his possessions are either his own, or else mercenaries, or auxiliaries, or mixed.

The mercenaries and auxiliary troops are useless and dangerous. Mercenaries are generally disunited, undisciplined, ambitious, faithless and cowardly when facing the enemy. A prince who resorts to them will be despoiled by them in times of peace, and in war by the enemy. Mercenaries have no other motivation than money, that is their wages; they have no particular love for the country they are fighting for and are not ready to die for their employer. They are quite willing to be his soldiers only as long as he does not make war.

A capable mercenary captain will try to dispossess the prince who employs him, to deprive him of his state and take power himself; or he will oppress the people against the advice of the prince in question and ruin him. An incapable and unskillful captain will also cause the ruin of the one who employs him. Therefore, a prince has no other choice but to take command of his army in person, as its captain.

AUXILIARY, MIXED AND NATIVE TROOPS

When a prince asks a powerful neighbour for help and defense, the forces sent to the rescue are called auxiliaries and are as useless as mercenaries. Those troops may be valuable in themselves, but they are useless and even dangerous for the one who borrows them, for if they lose he is defeated and if they conquer he remains their prisoner.

Auxiliary troops are more dangerous than mercenaries, for they are all united and owe obedience to strangers. Whereas mercenaries are in general divided and are dangerous by their cowardice and reluctance to fight, with auxiliary troops the danger lies in their courage. A wise prince therefore always avoids to use foreign troops and resorts to his own forces. He would prefer to lose with his own men than conquer with the forces of others, then a victory that has been gained by foreign arms is not a true one.

Troops of a mixed kind (partly mercenary and partly formed by national forces) are much better than troops entirely composed of mercenaries and auxiliaries, but much inferior to national forces. No prince is secure without his own troops. Only national forces or native forces composed of his subjects or citizens can provide him with an effective defense.

THE DUTIES OF THE PRINCE REGARDING HIS MILITIA

A prince must study diligently the art of war and practice it. The one who wants to command effectively shall practice this art, that allows princes to stay in power and sometimes common men to become princes. Those who neglect it sooner or later lose their power and their state.

A prince without arms becomes contemptible; and the worst thing that could happen to any prince is to be hated or despised. A prince who is ignorant of military matters and thinks more of luxury than of arms cannot be esteemed by his soldiers, nor have confidence in them. He ought therefore to practice the art of war in times of peace. He must know the territory that he rules , especially the nature of the land. This will allow him to know how and where to find the enemy, take up quarters, lead his armies, lay out battle plans and lay siege to towns to his advantage. To exercise his mind, he must also read history and study the actions of great men to imitate their success and avoid their mistakes.

LIBERALITY OR PARSIMONY

It is a good thing to look generous but dangerous to really possess and exercise this virtue. A too great generosity or liberality will consume the resources of the prince, who will become poor. He will then have to impose new taxes to compensate for his loss and his subjects will start to hate him for it. On the other hand a penniless prince is contemptible.

Therefore, it is better to be called a miser than to spend too much. In times, when citizens see that the revenues of their prince are sufficient to defend himself against his enemies, to make his wars and undertake great enterprises without burdening them with new taxes, then they will regard him as liberal. Only princes first esteemed niggardly can do great things in the long run. Others are ruined by excessive spending and frivolities.

OF CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED OR FEARED

It is of course better for a prince to be considered merciful and compassionate rather than cruel; but he must not abuse this clemency. He must not fear therefore, on occasions, to be called cruel in his effort to keep his citizens united and faithful to the government, then in this way he will be more merciful than those who by excess of kindness and laxity allow bloody disorders to take place. These disorders produce violence, looting and pillage that are harmful to the whole population, while the executions carried out by the prince will injure only a few individuals.

The prince must be at the same time feared and loved (this is best), but if he has to choose, it is much safer to be feared than loved. For it may be said of men in general that they are ungrateful, hypocrites, anxious to avoid danger and greedy; as long as you benefit them, they are faithful. In times of prosperity, they offer you their blood, their goods, their life and their children. But when difficulties arise, they refuse to help and they revolt. The prince cannot trust the goodness of the people (their words) and rely on their gratitude in times of need. If he does, he will be ruined. People have less scruple to offend or betray a prince that has made himself loved than one they fear genuinely , because love creates obligations and duties that can be betrayed when necessary. People being selfish will betray their prince anyhow, unless the fear of a dreadful punishment forces them to stay loyal.

However, if a prince must be feared, he must still avoid becoming hated. For fear and the absence of hatred may well go together. This result can be obtained by one who does not take the property of his citizens and subjects and leaves their women alone (does not touch them). When he is obliged to take the life of a citizen, he must justify this execution publicly by giving a valid reason. But above all, he must abstain from taking the property of others, for people forget more easily the death of their parents than the loss of their possessions.

IN WHAT WAY PRINCES MUST KEEP FAITH

There are two methods of fighting: by the law and by force. The first method is that of men, the second of beasts. As the first method is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the second (that is force). It is therefore necessary for a prince to be both: beast and man.

There are two ways to act as a beast: one can imitate the fox or the lion. The lion cannot avoid traps and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be both strong and clever: a fox to recognize traps and a lion to frighten the wolves.

To imitate the fox, the prince must disguise his character, he must feign and simulate. This is that much easier, then there are always people ready to be deceived; it is said that a deceiver will always find dupes.

Goodness, mercifulness, faithfulness, generosity, sincerity, humanity, compassion and religiousness are important qualities for a prince. It is not necessary that he really possesses all those qualities, but it is imperative that he seems to have them. On the contrary, it would be dangerous for a prince to possess and observe them, but to appear to have them is useful. It must be understood that a prince cannot observe all things which are considered good in man. He is often obliged in order to maintain his power to act against faith, against truth, against charity, against humanity, against religion and even against justice. He must take great care however, that all that comes out of his mouth is full of these qualities.

ONE MUST AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

The prince must avoid those actions and behaviours that will make him hated or despised. He will become hated by being rapacious and usurping the property and women of his subjects. Whenever one does not attack the property or honour of most men, they will live contented and will not revolt; the prince will then only have to combat the ambition of a few.

A prince will be despised if he is thought changeable, frivolous, effeminate, timid and irresolute. On the contrary, his actions must show grandeur, spirit, gravity and fortitude. His sentences must be irrevocable, his decisions once made cannot be changed. The prince who creates such an opinion of himself will gain respect, and it is very difficult to conspire against one who has a great reputation. He will not easily be attacked, as long as it is known that he is capable and reverenced by his subjects.

The prince has two dangers to fear: one internal as regards his subjects (citizens), one external as regards foreign powers. He can defend himself against external dangers with good arms and good friends (he will always have good friends if he has good arms). Internal matters will always remain quiet if they are not perturbed by conspiracy and there is no disturbance from without. There will generally be no conspiracy if the prince is not hated by the mass of the people. It is therefore important not to displease the nobles too much and to satisfy the population and keep it contented.

Sometimes hatred is incurred as much by good deeds as by evil actions. Therefore, a prince who wishes to maintain his power is often forced to do evil. If for example the populace, soldiery or nobles are corrupted, and if one party must be satisfied for keeping your position, then you must allow corruption to take place in this case. Any attempt by the prince to do good and be just and honest would be ill received here and detrimental to him. Any prince must then learn to be either good or wicked depending on the circumstances and the necessities of life.

One must be a ferocious lion and an astute fox, be feared and respected by all, not hated by the army and the people, not being rapacious and have a great reputation. He must be a warrior (or at least familiarized with military matters), popular among the soldiers and loved by the army in general. It is under these conditions that one becomes a great prince.

The only danger that such a prince has to fear is a fanatical assassin, a man determined to accomplish a suicide-mission. An assassin that does not fear death is very difficult to stop, but a prince has not much to fear in this instance as such men are extremely rare. He must only take care not to gravely offend one of his collaborators or someone close to him, who could become a potential assassin out of a desire for revenge. He must not keep in his service someone who might have cause to hate him.

OF ARMS AND MEN

A new prince has never been known to disarm his subjects, on the contrary he must arm them. For by arming them, these arms and these troops become your own; those that you suspected become faithful and those that were faithful remain so. Those citizens that were merely subjects of the prince become his partisans. Obviously all citizens cannot be armed. When you give this privilege of arms to some, this different treatment that they recognize renders these men obliged to you. On the other hand, if you disarm them, you offend them and show that you distrust them either through cowardice or lack of confidence, and this generates hatred against you. And as you cannot remain unarmed, you are obliged to resort to mercenaries; which would be disastrous. Therefore, a new prince must always have his subjects armed in his dominion.

But when a prince acquires a new-state in addition to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the inhabitants of that territory.

<<Divide to rule>> is not a good thing when it applies to one own country or principality. In times of war, when the enemy approaches, all cities divided against themselves will be immediately lost, then the weaker faction will side with the enemy and the other will not be strong enough to stand.

Princes have often found more faith and usefulness in those they didn't trust in the beginning, than in those they at first confided in. In fact, many of those who opposed the prince at the beginning of the new government will try to gain his favour in serving faithfully, so that they can maintain their position, improve their station and have him forget that they were once enemies. They will bring more help than those serving him for a long time with greater security, and who could be tempted to neglect his interests.

A prince who has taken a state with the secret help of its malcontent inhabitants must know that it will be impossible to satisfy them and that they will not stay his supporters for long. These perpetual malcontents will soon revolt against him too. It is much easier for a prince to get faithful supporters among those who were happy with the previous government and first opposed him, than among the endless complainers who helped him for a time, but which it is impossible to satisfy for very long.

HOW A PRINCE MUST ACT TO GAIN REPUTATION

Nothing makes a prince more popular as great enterprises and prowess in a successful war. He must continually do great things that keep his subjects' minds uncertain and astonished, and occupied in watching their results. These actions must arise one out of the other, so that they leave no time for men to settle down and act against him.

It is also very profitable for a prince to give some outstanding example of his greatness in the internal administration, by rewarding extraordinary good deeds and punishing evil actions in a manner that will be much talked about.

A prince is also esteemed when he is a true friend or a true enemy, that is: when he declares himself very clearly in favour of someone or against another. This policy is always better than remaining neutral. If a prince refuses to take side in a conflict between two neighbouring states and avoids declaring himself for or against one or the other, chances are it will harm him. He will fall prey to the victor. The vanquished will hate him and the winner won't trust him either. One who is not his friend will advise him to stay neutral and the one who is his true friend will ask him to declare himself by taking arms. Princes who choose neutrality to avoid immediate danger are mostly ruined because of this. They go to their doom in trying to evade the difficulty. In taking side openly, one cannot really lose (if anything: his self-respect).

A prince ought never to make common cause with one more powerful than himself to attack a third party, unless necessity forces him to do so; then if this party wins he rests in its power, and if it loses he is doomed.

A prince must reward merit, give preference to the able, and honor those who excel in every part. He must encourage his citizens to practice their trade freely, in such a way that one shall not refrain from improving his possessions for fear that they may be taken from him, and the other from starting a trade for fear of taxes. On the contrary, the prince must offer rewards to whoever does these things and to whoever seeks in any way to improve his city or state.

THE PRINCE'S COLLABORATORS

The choice of collaborators is very important for the prince, then it determines his wisdom according to whether they are able or not, faithful or ungrateful, good or bad. The first impression that one gets of a ruler and his intelligence is from seeing the men he has about him. A wise and clear-sighted prince surrounds himself with competent and faithful people. If it is not the case, one will always form an unfavourable opinion of him; then the first mistake that he makes is in this choice.

HOW TO AVOID FLATTERERS

There is no other way of guarding oneself against flattery than by letting people know that you will not be offended when they speak the truth. On the other hand, when everyone can tell you the truth, you lose their respect. A prudent prince must therefore take another course by choosing for his council wise men and giving these alone freedom to tell him the truth, but only on those things he asks and of nothing else. He must however inquire about everything important and hear their opinion. He will then be able to form his own opinion on these matters and make his decisions. The one who proceeds otherwise will act precipitately through flattery or else will change his mind much too often, and by that will be little esteemed by his people.

A prince therefore ought to take counsel, but only when he wishes. He ought to discourage attempts to advise him unless he asks it. But he must however be curious: a great asker and a patient listener of the truth about those things of which he has inquired; indeed, if he finds that anyone has scruples telling him the truth, he should be angry.

A prince who is not wise cannot be well advised and will soon lose power. People for the most part are false, deceitful and liars, unless they are compelled by necessity or their prince to be true. Therefore, it must be concluded that wise counsels are due to the prudence of the prince and not the prudence of the prince to the good counsels received.
 
 

For a long time, Machiavelli was thought to be the first one to theorize on power, to try to find recipes to gain or maintain political and military power.  But The Prince is perhaps not the first book on power.

We talk here about the Göttingen manuscript. Yes, the Göttingen manuscript. Not the Goettingen Gutenberg Bible ((ca. 1454), not the Göttingen Model Book (acquired 1770, dated mid-15th century(ca. 1450)), not even the Ruy Lopez chess opening document of 1490, no we mean the so-called Göttingen manuscript of power: the ''liber libri de ambitio'' a Latin manuscript of the twelve century.

The story behind the ''libri de ambitio'' is a remarkable one. First it was stolen from the University of Goettingen between December 1913 and may 1914 (one month prior to the beginning of the first World War).

1- This may be one of the most important text on strategy in history.

2-  General Helmuth von Moltke may have glanced at it sometimes in 1913.

3- We say <<glance>> because the whole thing is written in Latin and the handwriting of the two friars (scribes or clerks) who copied it is not exactly easy to read.

4- No known photograph of the document was taken before its disappearance.

5- The fact that one half of the manuscript's content is a transcription of something that was first delivered and later passed on by oral tradition complicates things a bit.

6- The one person claiming to have it now in its possession (an auctioneer from Austin, Texas) sends us photographs that are just too good to be true. Granted the text itself seems to be genuine. Enlargements at 75X75 dpi show how old the parchment is, yellow, brownish yellow, the cracks, the wear and tear of the material, small pieces missing, etc. It all fits. But the illustrations... One important part of the document are its illustrations and there, something very curious is to be noted. The 24 pictures are very clear (almost too clear), the colors too bright, small parts of the drawings are reminiscent or simply copied from at least 3 French manuscripts of the time, but they are made into something entirely new. There is definitely a progression in these images, almost as if they contained a hidden message, a code, key or formula. In fact it is mentioned several times in the text that the key is in the illustrations.

But before this begins to sound too fantastic, and one is reminded of the plot of a popular spy novel, let's now talk about the content of the manuscript itself. One half of the document is made by a monologue by the campfire of the great warrior Attila, who had almost succeeded in his time in conquering the Roman empire. In this three days monologue, he outlines a plan to achieve world domination: finish the West and then march on the East (China). This famous conversation with his generals may be seen as <<the blueprint for world conquest>>, a plan that is said to have inspired Genghis Khan himself 800 years later.

The other part of the document is made out of four well known accounts and comments on Alexander's conquest of the Persian empire in Latin, that are brought up here as a comparison with the nomadic art of war that is outlined in the monologue. The Hun's document stresses the importance of the tribes not to abandon their traditional way of life. It reminds them that they are nomads and that the civilization of the cities is the enemy. To defeat it, it could require not only to conquer and destroy those cities, but also its agricultural foundation: to kill the soil, not only the farmer. The temptation of the Khan 1000 years later to turn Asia into a desert to ensure the victory of the steppe and of the nomads could find its roots in the Attila monologue.

Further points of the argumentation. The whole nation must be mobilized, every citizen must help in the war effort: it is a total war. Cavalry and mobility: nomads go where they please, and strike when and where they please. It is their main advantage on sedentary civilization and fixed settlements. High walls and fortifications do not help in the long run; agricultural civilizations become prisoners of them. They can be breached or the enemy could go around them.

So, this is a brief account of the manuscript and what's in it. As for its authenticity, questions arise. The beauty  and remarkable state of conservation of its illustrations, there is almost perspective in its drawings, something that will be rediscovered only by the Renaissance. If this is a fake, it is a remarkable one! And why should one try to fake the quite understandable and believable account of an Attila monologue by the campfire, where he devises with his generals the best way to win battles and conquer the remnants of the Roman empire. Such a conversation is likely to have taken place, and the fact that a Roman scribe and translator was on site to write it down is in itself nothing so much out of the ordinary.

There is not even enough for the plot of an Indiana Jones film here, let alone the new James Bond. The only puzzling thing is that the manuscript disappears, and on top of it, on the very eve of the first World war, and in Germany. The other is that many know about the manuscript, but others don't, or feign not to know about it. Even experts, history professors, either don't know about it or think it is not true: the last of the urban legends. It could be compared to the Philadelphia experiment: some swear it happened, although the evidence is circumstantial at best (we know that something suspicious happened on the harbour that day, but what it is...?), others recognize it for what it probably is:... an urban legend, the plot of a successful novel and the scenario of a good movie.

Of course, mention is made somewhere in the archives that several 12th century manuscripts have either been misplaced or are altogether missing, but quite understandably the university is not advertising the fact. But although they have been very quiet about it, the legend is enduring, if it is one! Too many young history students still ask about the manuscript these days, for it not to have existed. And the photos, you should see the magnificence of these pictures, ''enluminures'' they called them, among the most beautiful ever made. So beautiful in fact, that this is the very problem. For modern taste, very few enluminures of the12th century are appealing and could be called very beautiful. These one are.

On this site we do not have the space to put such pictures (of this size and magnitude). A mere gallery of thumbnails of these 24 pictures could make you see. You still have the possibility though to go to  http://giskhan.tripod.com/   and watch them there.
 

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